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Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, 365 P.3d 1227 (Addendum 
B). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(5) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Under section 41-6a-502(1)—the general DUI statute—a person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he operates a vehicle while “under the in-
fluence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a ve-
hicle.” Section 41-6a-503 makes it a class A misdemeanor if the person in-
flicts “bodily injury upon another” by driving negligently. Section 41-6a-503 
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then makes it a third degree felony to drive while impaired by alcohol or 
drugs and negligently cause serious bodily injury of another. And section 
76-5-207 makes it a third degree felony to drive while impaired by alcohol 
or drugs and negligently cause death of another. None of these general DUI 
statutes differentiate between legal and illegal drugs.  
 The Code also has provisions specific to drivers using illegal drugs. 
Section 41-6a-517(2) provides that in “cases not amounting to a violation of 
Section 41-6a-502,” a person commits a class B misdemeanor if he operates a 
motor vehicle and “has any measurable [illegal] controlled substance” in his 
body (the general “DWI” statute).1 And Section 58-37-8(2) enhances DWI for 
drivers who use illegal drugs and negligently cause serious bodily injury or 
death. Specifically, section 58-37-8(2) provides that “in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207,” the person commits a class A 
misdemeanor if he has in his body “any measurable amount” of a Schedule 
III, IV, or V controlled substance; he commits a third degree felony if the il-
legal substance is marijuana, THC, or their equivalents or analogs; and he 
commits a second degree felony if the illegal substance is a Schedule I or 
Schedule II controlled substance (other than marijuana, THC, their equiva-
lents or analogs).   
                                              
1 DWI is shorthand for Driving With Illegal drugs in the body. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Did the court of appeals err in holding that the DWI’s second-degree-
felony provision violates the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the 
Utah Constitution, where the court’s holding was based on its conclusion 
that impaired drivers using illegal drugs could only be charged with a third 
degree felony under the general DUI statutes?  
 Standard of Review. Whether a statute violates Utah’s uniform-
operation-of-laws provision is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶9, 233 P.3d 476. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions and statutes are reproduced 
in Addendum A:  
 Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (uniform operation of laws) 
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West 2013) (DUI) 
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(2) (West 2013) (DUI w/serious injury) 
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 (West 2013) (DWI) 
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 2016) (DWI w/serious injury 
or death) 
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (West 2015) (DUI automobile homicide) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual background. 
 On Christmas Eve 2011, Defendant veered over a raised center medi-
an in his Suburban into oncoming traffic, clipped the back end of an east-
bound car, and crashed head-on into another eastbound car, a Subaru Out-
back. R2. The head-on collision seriously injured the Subaru’s driver, Ryan 
Pack, and its front-seat passenger, Raquel Pack, and killed the couple’s 18-
month-old son, C.P., who was strapped in a car seat in the back of the car. 
R2,396. The couple’s three-year-old son, who was also in a car seat in the 
back, escaped serious injury. R2,396. Defendant told police that he lost con-
trol of his car when he reached for his cell phone on the floorboard of the 
car. R339. A subsequent blood test revealed that Defendant had a metham-
phetamine level of 0.2 mg/L. R396. 
B. Summary proceedings. 
1. Trial court proceedings. 
 As relevant here, the State charged Defendant under the DWI statute 
with three counts of driving with a measurable amount of a Schedule II con-
trolled substance in his body without a prescription and negligently causing 
death or serious bodily injury, all second degree felonies. R1-3,33-35. De-
fendant moved to amend the counts to one count of DUI automobile homi-
cide and two counts of DUI with serious injury, all third degree felonies,  
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arguing that the second-degree-felony provision in the DWI statute violates 
the Utah Constitution’s Uniform Operation of Laws provision. R56-64. After 
the trial court denied the motion, R125,133, Defendant moved to reconsider 
and to declare the second-degree-felony provision unconstitutional. R146-
54. The court denied those motions as well. R171,229,232-39; R453.  
 Defendant petitioned for permission to appeal the interlocutory or-
ders denying his motions, but the petition was denied. R241-51,325-26. De-
fendant thereafter pled guilty to all three DWI counts, reserving the right to 
appeal the trial court’s denials of his motions to amend and to declare the 
DWI statute’s second-degree-felony provision unconstitutional. R335-
36,340-46.. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive prison terms 
of one-to-fifteen years on all three counts and ordered the payment of some 
$24,000 in restitution. R437-38,496. Defendant timely appealed. R442.  
2. Direct appeal. 
 On appeal, Defendant argued that the DWI statute’s second-degree-
felony provision violates the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the 
Utah Constitution in two ways: (1) “by distinguishing between those who 
have a prescription for a controlled substance and those who do not,” and 
(2) “by classifying a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute by use of a 
Schedule I or II controlled substance as a second-degree felony, while classi-
-6- 
fying the more culpable offenses of [DUI] Automobile Homicide and DUI 
With Serious Injury as third degree felonies.” Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶9.  
 The court of appeals rejected Defendant’s first claim.  In doing so, the 
court recognized that “[t]hose who have a prescription for a controlled sub-
stance may be charged only under the [DUI] Automobile Homicide Statute 
or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute, not the [DWI] Statute.”  Id. at ¶11. 
Thus, “unlike nonprescription users, prescription users can be charged with 
no more than a third-degree felony and can be convicted only if the State 
demonstrates that they were intoxicated to a degree that rendered them in-
capable of safely operating a motor vehicle.”  Id. “However, [this] classifica-
tion does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision,” because “the 
legislature has an interest in deterring the illegal use of controlled substanc-
es.” Id. at ¶12.   
 But the court of appeals agreed with Defendant’s second claim. In 
reaching that conclusion, the court first noted that both the DUI automobile 
homicide statute and the DUI with serious injury statute “apply to individ-
uals under the influence of ‘any drug’” and thus do not differentiate be-
tween drugs “used in accordance with a valid prescription and drugs used 
illegally.” Id. at ¶15.  The court further noted that the DWI statute “implicit-
ly identifies the [DUI] Automobile Homicide Statute as defining an offense 
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that could apply to users of illegal drugs by specifically distinguishing it 
from the [DWI] Statute, stating that ‘[a] person is subject to the penalties’ of 
the [DWI] Statute when the person violates the statute ‘in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of [the Automobile Homicide Statute ].’” Id. at ¶15 
(citation omitted).  
 But then, instead of recognizing the “not amounting to” language in 
the DWI statute as giving prosecutors discretion to determine which provi-
sion to charge under—which is the usual meaning given that language—the 
court of appeals held that the statute’s “not amounting to” language actual-
ly limited the prosecutor’s discretion. Specifically, the court held that be-
cause of the “not amounting to” language, those “intoxicated by . . . illegal 
substances to a degree that they are incapable of safely operating a vehicle” 
must “be prosecuted under the [DUI] Automobile Homicide State or the 
DUI With Serious Injury Statute”; meanwhile, “those who have consumed 
illegal substances to a lesser degree” must “be prosecuted under the Meas-
urable Amount Statute.”  Id. at ¶16. 
 Thus, the court concluded, “a conviction under the [DWI] Statute is a 
second-degree felony when the individual has a measureable amount of a 
Schedule I or II controlled substance in his or her body”—but is not yet im-
paired—but if a person using that same substance is impaired, he can only 
-8- 
be found guilty of a third degree felony under the DUI two statutes. Id. at 
¶16.  This disparate treatment violated the Uniform Operation of Laws pro-
vision, the court held, because  there is no rational basis “for punishing in-
dividuals who have ‘any measurable amount’ of controlled substance in 
their body more harshly than individuals who have an incapacitating 
amount of substance in their bodies.” Id. at ¶¶9,13-17. The Court thus vacat-
ed Defendant’s second degree felony sentences and remanded with instruc-
tions that the trial court re-enter Defendant’s convictions as third degree 
felonies. Id. at ¶18. 
 Defendant also challenged the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 
sentences. Although the court of appeals’s decision striking the second-
degree-felony designation required re-sentencing, the court of appeals ad-
dressed the issue because it had “been fully briefed and is likely to arise on 
remand.” Id. at ¶19. The court then rejected Defendant’s challenge to con-
secutive sentences, holding that although the mitigating factors identified 
by Defendant “could have supported a decision to impose concurrent sen-
tences, they do not mandate such an outcome” and that nothing in the rec-
ord indicates that the trial court did not consider those factors. Id. at ¶21. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The court of appeals held that the DWI second-degree-felony en-
hancement (for driving with a measurable Schedule I or II controlled sub-
stance in the body and causing serious bodily injury or death) violates the 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision because it imposes a punishment 
harsher than the DUI automobile homicide and DUI with serious injury of-
fenses, which are both third degree felonies. The court based this holding on 
its interpretation that the DWI enhancement statute applies only to offend-
ers who have a measurable amount of a controlled substance in their bodies, 
but not an impairing amount. That interpretation is wrong. By its plain lan-
guage, the DWI statute applies to those with “any” measurable amount of a 
controlled substance in their bodies, whether or not factually, that amount 
impairs the driver’s ability to drive safely. Thus, the court of appeals erred 
in holding that the DWI statute classifies drivers based on their degree of 
intoxication. It does not. To the contrary, and as the legislative history 
demonstrates, the Legislature adopted a zero-tolerance philosophy with re-
spect to illegal drugs, creating a conclusive presumption of impairment 
whenever any measurable amount of an illegal controlled substance is 
found in the body.  
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ARGUMENT 
THE DWI STATUTE’S SECOND-DEGREE-FELONY 
PROVISION CRIMINALIZING DRIVING WITH AN 
ILLEGAL SCHEDULE I OR II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN THE BODY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
 The court of appeals erred when it interpreted the “not amounting to” 
language in the DWI statute to preclude prosecution of an impaired driver 
using illegal drugs for a second degree felony under the DWI statute.  It also 
erred when, based on that interpretation, it held that the second-degree-
felony provision in the statute was unconstitutional.  This Court should re-
verse.   
 The Utah Legislature has targeted both driving under the influence of 
drugs (“DUI”) and driving while using illegal drugs (“DWI”). Utah’s DUI 
statute makes it a class B misdemeanor to drive while “under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (West 2013). Utah’s DWI statute  makes it 
a class B misdemeanor to drive while using a controlled substance—shown 
by having “any measurable controlled substance . . . in the person’s body”—
without a valid prescription. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (West 2013). 
The Legislature treats the two offenses as equally serious. DUI is a class B 
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misdemeanor—whether or not the impairing drug is being legally used. 
DWI is a class B misdemeanor—whether or not there is a factual showing of 
impairment.  
 In a patchwork of statutes scattered throughout the Code, the Legisla-
ture has enhanced the penalties for both DUI and DWI when the offender 
negligently drives and causes serious bodily injury or death of another.  
 The DUI enhancements for serious bodily injury or death are found in 
two statutes: one under the Traffic Code and the other under the Criminal 
Code. Under section 41-6a-503, impaired drivers who negligently cause se-
rious bodily injury are guilty of a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6a-503(2)(a) (West 2013). Under section 76-5-207—the DUI automobile hom-
icide statute—impaired drivers who negligently cause death are likewise 
guilty of a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(a)(ii) (West 
2015).  
 The DWI enhancements for serious bodily injury or death are found 
in a different statute: section 58-37-8(2) of the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act. Under that section, a driver having any measurable amount of illegal 
drugs in his body who negligently causes serious bodily injury or death fac-
es enhancements ranging from a class A misdemeanor to a second degree 
felony, depending on the type of drug in the driver’s body: 
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 It is a “class A misdemeanor” if the controlled substance is “classified 
under Schedules III, IV, or V”; 
 It is a “third degree felony” if the controlled substance is marijuana, 
THC, or their equivalents or analogs; and 
 It is a “second degree felony” if the controlled substance is “classified 
under Schedule I,” (other than marijuana, THC, their equivalents, or 
analogs) or “under Schedule II.”  
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g)-(h) (West 2012). At issue in this case is the 
DWI second-degree-felony enhancement.  
 The court of appeals struck the provision as unconstitutional because 
it imposes a harsher penalty than the DUI enhancements in sections 41-6a-
503 and 76-5-207. The court interpreted the DWI enhancement statute as 
implicating those who “have a measurable amount in their bodies,” but on-
ly if they have a “lesser degree” of drugs in their system than those who 
have an amount that renders them impaired, i.e. “incapable of safely operat-
ing a vehicle.” State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶16, 365 P.3d 1227. It then 
held that there was no “rational basis for punishing individuals who have 
‘any measurable amount’ of controlled substance in their bodies more 
harshly than individuals who have an incapacitating amount of the sub-
stance in their bodies.” Id. at ¶9.  
 The court of appeals’ interpretation of the DWI enhancement  as not 
applying to drivers impaired by an illegal controlled substance was wrong, 
and that misinterpretation led to an erroneous conclusion that the en-
-13- 
hancement violates the uniform-operation-of-laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution. This Court should reverse. 
* * * 
 Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that “[a]ll laws 
of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” To comply with this  
provision, “it is not enough that [the law] be uniform on its face. Lee v. Gau-
fin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). The law must be uniform in its operation 
as well. Id. To have uniform operation, then,  a law must meet two require-
ments. “ ‘First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Sec-
ond, the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the clas-
ses must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute.’ ” State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.3d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)).  
 Accordingly, when examining the constitutionality of a law under the 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision, the Court must first determine what 
classification is created under the challenged statute and whether that clas-
sification imposes disparate treatment on similarly situated persons. Drej, 
2010 UT 35, ¶34. If the statute does not treat similarly situated persons dif-
ferently, “Article I, section 24 is not violated,” and the inquiry ends.  State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ¶35, 57 P.3d 977. But if the statute does treat similarly sit-
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uated persons differently, the Court must then “analyze the scheme to de-
termine if ‘the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the 
disparity.’ ” Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶34 (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 
¶12, 63 P.3d 667). As explained below, the DWI second-degree-felony en-
hancement satisfies the constitutional guarantee of the uniform operation of 
laws. 
A. Contrary to the court of appeals’ holding, the DWI enhance-
ment statute does not create a classification that distinguishes 
between those with and without impairing amounts of a con-
trolled substance—even when read in conjunction with the 
DUI enhancement statutes. 
 The threshold question for the Court is “what, if any, classification is 
created under the [DWI] statute.” Id. This question turns on the statutory 
interpretation of the DWI enhancement provision. It is here that the court of 
appeals erred. 
 When interpreting a statute, this Court’s objective is “to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to 
achieve.” Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). In discerning 
that intent, the Court looks first to the statute’s plain language—with a pre-
sumption that “the Legislature chose its words carefully, using each term 
advisedly” and “according to its ordinary meaning.” State v. LeBeau, 2014 
UT 39, ¶26, 337 P.3d 254. If the statute’s “plain meaning . . . can be discerned 
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from its language,” the Court need look no further. LPI Services v. McGee, 
2009 UT 41, ¶12, 240 P.3d 780. But if the statute’s plain language “is suscep-
tible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” the Court may then seek 
guidance from the legislative history and policy considerations that animat-
ed the legislation. LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, ¶26. 
 The Court must also interpret a statute through a prism reflective of a 
legislative intent that the law be in harmony with common sense, with re-
lated statutory provisions, and with the constitution. S & F Supply Co. v. 
Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974). Thus, the Court assumes that the Leg-
islature intends to avoid absurd results. State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶8, 217 
P.3d 265. It assumes that the Legislature intends consistency among related 
provisions and statutes. LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, ¶20. And it assumes that “the 
Legislature intends to complement, not contradict, constitutional protec-
tions.” Smith v. United States, 2015 UT 68, ¶21, 356 P.3d 1249. The Court is 
duty bound to interpret a statute with these presumptions in mind. See S & 
F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974). The court of appeals 
failed to apply these presumptions here. 
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1. The DWI enhancement statute governs all drivers who il-
legally use drugs and negligently cause serious bodily in-
jury or death. 
 The DWI enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g), cre-
ates a classification among drug users based on two characteristics. The 
statute applies to all persons who (1) negligently drive a vehicle and cause 
serious bodily injury or death of another (“negligent driver” as shorthand), 
and (2) “knowingly and intentionally” have in their body “any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance” without a valid prescription (“illegal 
drug users” as shorthand). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a),(g). Thus, within 
the class of illegal drug users who negligently drive and cause serious bodi-
ly injury or death, the statute has uniform application—all are subject to the 
statute’s enhanced penalties. 
 Although the DWI enhancement statute has uniform application 
among the broad class of illegal drug users who negligently drive, it creates 
three sub-classes that are subject to different penalties based on the type of 
drug present in the body: (1) a second degree felony if the drug is a Sched-
ule I or II controlled substance, other than marijuana, THC, or their analogs 
or equivalents; (2) a third degree felony if the drug is marijuana, THC, or 
their analogs or equivalents; and (3) a class A misdemeanor if the substance 
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is a Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance. Utah Code Ann.   § 58-37-
8(2)(h).  
 The court of appeals, however, held that the DWI enhancement stat-
ute creates yet another classification when read in conjunction with the en-
hancement statutes of DUI automobile homicide and DUI with serious inju-
ry. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶16. The court held that when read together, 
the three statutes create two classes of offenders “based on their degree of in-
toxication.” Id. (emphasis added). The court identified the two classes as (1) 
“[t]hose who are intoxicated by legal or illegal substances to a degree that 
they are incapable of safely operating a vehicle”—i.e., DUI automobile hom-
icide and DUI with serious injury offenders; and (2) “those who have con-
sumed illegal substances to a lesser degree, but still have a measurable 
amount in their bodies”—i.e., DWI enhancement offenders. Id. (emphasis 
added). No such classification exists. 
 The enhancements of DUI automobile homicide and DUI with serious 
injury undoubtedly classify negligent drivers based on their degree of intox-
ication. Negligent drivers who are “under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that 
renders [them] incapable of safely operating a vehicle” are guilty of a third 
degree felony under both statutes; those less impaired are not. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(2)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207(2)(a)(ii).  
 Contrary to the court of appeals’ holding, however, the plain lan-
guage of the DWI enhancement statute does not classify offenders accord-
ing to their degree of intoxication. Rather, the statute classifies negligent 
drivers based on whether or not they “knowingly and intentionally” have in 
their body “any measurable amount of a controlled substance” without a 
prescription. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a),(g)(i) (emphasis added). Those 
with a measurable amount of a controlled substance are subject to the en-
hanced penalties of the statute; those without a measurable amount are not.  
 The word “any” is commonly understood as meaning “in whatever 
quantity or number, great or small.” Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged 
Dictionary of the English Language 96 (1996) (emphasis added). Thus, those 
with great amounts of an illegal controlled substance, as well as those with 
small amounts of an illegal controlled substance, are subject to the enhanced 
penalties of the statute, so long as the amount is large enough to be measur-
able. By its plain language, then,  the DWI enhancement statute necessarily 
reaches those who are factually impaired because they have greater quanti-
ties of a controlled substance in their bodies.  
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 Thus, the DWI enhancement statute is not limited to those “who have 
consumed illegal substances to a lesser degree, but still have a measurable 
amount in their bodies,” as held by the court of appeals. Ainsworth, 2016 UT 
App 2, ¶16. It reaches all those with “any” measurable amount. Simply put, 
the degree of intoxication is not an element of the DWI enhancement stat-
ute, as it is with the DUI enhancement statutes. 
 In support of its holding that the DWI enhancement statute is limited 
to those with a “lesser degree” of intoxication, the court of appeals relied  on 
the statute’s qualifying language: “A person is subject to the penalties under 
Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of [the Au-
tomobile Homicide statute] . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(g) (emphasis 
added). The court concluded this qualifying language “indicates that the 
legislature anticipated that the automobile homicide statute would apply to 
nonprescription users of controlled substances under certain circumstanc-
es.” Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶15. But even if true, that does not mean—as 
the court of appeals held—that the DWI enhancement statute covers only 
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measurable amounts that do not impair a user’s ability to drive safely.2 As 
noted, by its plain and unambiguous terms, the DWI enhancement statute 
includes “any” measurable amount—which again, necessarily includes im-
pairing amounts. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g)(i). 
 Many criminal statutes found in our Code are prefaced with similar 
“not amounting to” language, and they typically refer to offenses that are 
equal or greater in degree. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-19 (West Supp. 
2016) (describing possession or sale of crystal iodine, a class B misdemean-
or, as not amounting to greater offense of possessing or selling controlled 
substance precursor); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401.2 (West 2015) (describing 
unlawful sexual conduct with 16- or 17-year old, a third degree felony, as 
not amounting to greater offenses of rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, for-
cible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, or their attempts); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (West 2015) (describing sexual abuse of a child, a second 
                                              
2 The State maintains that the DUI enhancement statutes may include 
both legal drug use and illegal drug use. But if such an interpretation were 
to render the statutory scheme unconstitutional, this Court should reconcile 
the three statutes by interpreting the DUI statutes as covering only legal 
drug use. Where the DWI statute specifically governs illegal drug use, the 
more general description of drug impairment can reasonably be interpreted 
as addressing legal drug use only. This would be in keeping with the 
Court’s “ ‘duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to . . . save it 
from constitutional conflicts or infirmities’ ”State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 
¶12, 31 P.3d 547 (citation omitted).  
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degree felony, as not amounting to the greater offenses of rape of a child, 
object rape of a child, sodomy on a child, or their attempts); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-106 (West 2016) (describing criminal mischief, a third degree felony, 
as not amount to greater offense of arson); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-102 (West 
2015) (describing incest, a third degree felony, as not amounting to greater 
offenses of rape, rape of a child, or aggravated assault); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-702 (West 2015) (describing lewdness, a class B misdemeanor, as not 
amounting to greater offenses of rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, forcible 
sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, or their attempts).  
 And Utah courts have never interpreted the “not amounting to” lan-
guage as limiting a prosecutor’s ability to prosecute under that statute.  Ra-
ther, our courts have consistently held that “‘[t]he primary purpose of the 
“under the circumstances not amounting to” language” is “to encourage 
criminal punishment under those greater crimes when the evidence in a particular 
case warrants it.’ ” State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ¶33, 8 P.3d 1025 (quoting State v. 
Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 445 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1996)) (emphasis added). And, indeed, that this is the purpose here becomes 
clear when the “not amounting to” language in the DWI statute is applied 
to the statute as a whole and not, as the court of appeals applied it, to only 
the second-degree-felony enhancement.  
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 In fact, the “not amounting to” language is prefatory language to sub-
section (2)(g)’s articulation of the enhancement elements: 
 A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) 
who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
 (i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and inten-
tionally having in the person’s body any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance; and  
 (ii) operates a motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury . . . or the death of another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g) (emphasis added). The prefatory language, 
therefore, does not specifically refer to the second-degree-felony enhance-
ment, or any other enhancement for that matter. Indeed, the most reasona-
ble interpretation of the “not amounting to” language is that it means what 
this Court has taken that same language to mean in other statutes—to en-
courage prosecution and punishment for whatever offense is highest in de-
gree when the evidence in a particular case warrants it. 
 Here, DUI automobile homicide is not equal to or greater than the 
second-degree-felony enhancement, the first of the three enhancement pro-
visions. But it is equal in degree to the marijuana enhancement, also a third 
degree felony, and it is greater in degree than the schedule III, IV, or V en-
hancement, a class A misdemeanor. Like other statutes containing the “not 
amounting to” language, the “not amounting to” language in the DWI en-
hancement statute “was likely to encourage criminal punishment” for the 
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greatest offense where the evidence in the particular case warrants it. Thus, 
the statute encourages punishment for third degree felony DUI automobile 
homicide if the evidence supports that charge, even if a defendant could be 
punished for the class A misdemeanor enhancement for a schedule III, IV, 
or V controlled substance. Where marijuana is the controlled substance in 
the body, the statute assures punishment as a third degree felony—whether 
or not there is a factual showing of impairment. And the statute encourages 
punishment as a second degree felony where the drug is a schedule I or II 
controlled substance—again, whether or not there is a factual showing of 
impairment.  
 This reading of the statute is consistent with the holding in Reed. And 
this Court “presume[s] the Legislature is aware of [its] case law.” Olseth v. 
Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶39, 158 P.3d 532. Thus, where the Legislature enacted 
the DWI enhancement statute three years after Reed, see 2003 Utah Laws c. 
10, p. 203, 204, the Court must  presume the Legislature intended the “not 
amounting to” language in the statute be interpreted consistent with Reed.  
2. The legislative history and policy considerations that an-
imate the DWI enhancement statute demonstrate that the 
Legislature intended to create a legal presumption of im-
pairment whenever drug use is unlawful. 
 The enhancement provisions were part of the “Automobile Homicide 
Amendments” of Senate Bill 7, which modified both the Utah Controlled 
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Substances Act and the automobile homicide statute. 2003 Utah Laws c.10, 
at 203-05. The bill explained that its amendments provided that “a person 
who operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner and causes death or se-
rious bodily injury, while having a measurable amount of controlled sub-
stance in his body, is subject to one degree greater penalty under the con-
trolled substance laws.” Id. at 203. At that time, possession or use of a 
Schedule I or II controlled substance was a third degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2003). But under the 2003 amendments, illegal 
users were made subject to a “one degree more” enhancement under sub-
section (4)(c) when they drove during use and negligently caused serious 
bodily injury or death. Id. at 204-05. In doing so, the Legislature kept in 
place the third degree felony designation for automobile homicide. See id. at 
205. This was no mistake. 
 The bill’s sponsor, Senator Carlene M. Walker, explained that the bill 
was in response to “difficulties in linking a particular level of impairment to 
a drug, like is done for alcohol,” and was thus “modeled after a zero-
tolerance philosophy.” 2003 S.F.D. Day 8, at 58:14-40 & 59:40-45, located at 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=8443&meta
_id=412710 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). Referring to the DWI enhancement 
provisions as another form of “automobile homicide,” Senator Walker ex-
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plained that “if an illegal substance is taken into the body and a death oc-
curs as a result of a car accident, that driver may be prosecuted for automo-
bile homicide” under the enhancement provisions. Id. at 59:40-45. But “if a 
person is given a drug without their knowledge or if they have a prescrip-
tion for the drug and they are properly taking it, this law would not apply.” 
Id. at 59:45 – 1:00:04. In that case, the State would be required to turn to the 
DUI enhancement statutes. 
 The difficulties of determining drug impairment are real. “[W]hile the 
impairing effects of alcohol are well-understood, there is limited research 
and data on the crash risk of specific drugs, impairment, and how drugs affect 
driving-related skills.” A. Berning & D. Smither, Understanding the Limitations 
of Drug Test Information, Reporting, and Testing Practices in Fatal Crashes, Be-
havioral Safety Research (NHTSA, November 2014) (emphasis added). State 
alcohol laws “are based on evidence concerning the decreased ability of 
drivers across the population to function safely” at specified blood alcohol 
levels. Id. But “[s]uch evidence is not currently available for concentrations 
of other drugs.” Id. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has 
thus concluded that “[c]urrent knowledge about the effects of drugs other 
than alcohol on driving performance is insufficient to make [scientific] 
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judgments about connections between drug use, driving performance, and 
crash risk.” Id.  
 In short, the research has been unable to determine precisely how and 
when drug use affects driving-related performance. That said, epidemiolo-
gy studies of methamphetamine—the drug found in Defendant’s body—
have reported the very effects on driving found in this case—“drive-off-the-
road type accidents, high speed, failing to stop, diminished divided attention, in-
attentive driving, impatience, and high risk driving” by those using metham-
phetamine. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Methamphetamine (Am-
phetamine), 64 (NHTSA, April 2014), located at http://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
people/injury/researchjob185drugs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) 
(emphasis added). Id. “Significant impairment of driving performance 
would also be expected during drug withdrawal.” Id. For example, in a re-
view of 101 driving under the influence cases where only methampheta-
mine was detected, “[i]mpairment was attributed to distraction, disorienta-
tion, motor excitation, hyperactive reflexes, general cognitive impairment, 
or withdrawal, fatigue and hypersomonlence.” Id.  
 Given the danger illegal drug use poses and the difficulties associated 
with showing drug impairment, the Legislature instead adopted a “zero-
tolerance philosophy”—creating, in essence, a legal presumption of im-
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pairment for those who illegally use drugs, drive, and negligently cause se-
rious bodily injury or death. The Legislature’s zero-tolerance policy with re-
spect to illegal drug use is no different than its .08 BAC policy with respect 
to alcohol use. In both cases, no separate showing of driving impairment is 
required. Like the .08 DUI provision, the zero-tolerance provision for illegal 
drug use is a conclusive, legislative presumption that the driver is under the 
influence to a degree that renders him incapable of safely operating a vehi-
cle. Cf. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah 1983) (holding that 
former DUI law “gives rise to a conclusive presumption of being under the 
influence”). And the Legislature does not offend the Constitution by adopt-
ing such a presumption. See State v. Kelson, 2014 UT 50, ¶ 20, 345 P.3d 1136 
(“The legislature has the discretion to define the elements of a crime as it 
sees fit. In so doing, it is not at all foreclosed from employing the terminolo-
gy or concept of a presumption.”).  
 Read in this light, the premise of the court of appeals’ holding col-
lapses entirely. See Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶12 (holding that courts have “a 
‘duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to . . . save it from consti-
tutional conflicts or infirmities’ ”) (citation omitted). The legislative history 
and the policy considerations animating the DWI enhancement statute do 
not support the view that the Legislature intended to impose harsher penal-
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ties on those who have non-impairing amounts of illegal drugs in their bod-
ies than those who have impairing amounts of illegal drugs in their bodies. 
It instead supports the plain language of the statute that negligent drivers 
with “any” measurable amount of an illegal drug are subject to the statute’s 
enhancements.   
* * * 
 In sum, this Court should reject the court of appeals’ holding that the 
DWI enhancement statute creates a classification of offenders “based on 
their  degree of intoxication.” Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶ 16. Doing so is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, as well as the legislative histo-
ry and policies animating the DWI enhancement statute. And doing so vio-
lates the canons of statutory construction requiring appellate courts to con-
sider a statute “in its relationship to the total fabric of the law,” and to in-
terpret its provisions “as to be consistent with common sense, and with el-
emental principles of justice.” S&F Supply Co., 527 P.2d at 221. 
B. The sub-classifications created by the DWI enhancement 
statute are warranted by reasonable legislative objectives. 
 As explained, the only classifications created by the DWI enhance-
ment statute are the three sub-classes of drivers illegally using drugs who 
negligently cause serious bodily injury or death of another. Those classifica-
tions are based on the type of controlled substance in the body: (1) negligent 
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drivers with a Schedule I or II controlled substance in their bodies are guilty 
of a second degree felony; (2) negligent drivers with marijuana, THC, their 
equivalents or analogs in their bodies are guilty of a third degree felony; 
and (3) negligent drivers with a Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance 
in their bodies are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(h).  
 The question under the Uniform Operation of Laws provision, then, 
is whether the Legislature “ ‘had any reasonable objective that warrants’ ” 
the disparate treatment based on the type of drug. See Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶34 
(quoting Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶12). This Court has already answered that 
question in the affirmative.  
 In State v. Robinson, this Court addressed a challenge to the disparate 
treatment of defendants in cases involving simple possession or use of ille-
gal drugs based on the type of drug—use of marijuana as a class B misde-
meanor and use of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and other Schedule I 
or II drugs as a third degree felony. 2011 UT 30, ¶21, 254 P.3d 183. The 
Court explained that determining whether the Legislature had reasonable 
objectives to warrant such disparate treatment requires a three-part inquiry: 
“(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the objectives of the 
legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable rela-
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tionship between the classification and the legislative purpose.” 2011 UT 30, 
¶22, 254 P.3d 183. After conducting that inquiry, the Court in Robinson con-
cluded that the disparate treatment was indeed warranted by reasonable 
legislative objectives. The same rationale applies to the DWI enhancements. 
 First, Robinson held that the classification based on drug type “is rea-
sonable,” observing that “it is widely accepted that the use of marijuana is 
less dangerous and addictive than the use of methamphetamine, cocaine, or 
heroin.” Id. at ¶23. Robinson observed that “the legislative guidelines for 
scheduling controlled substances reflect this understanding by requiring the 
advisory committee to classify each substance according to (1) its potential 
for abuse, (2) whether an accepted standard has been established for safe 
use in treatment for medical purposes, (3) the level of psychological or 
physiological dependence resulting from abuse of the substance, and (4) 
how the substance is classified under federal law.” Id.  
 Second, Robinson held that the objectives of the legislative action are 
legitimate. Id. at ¶24. The Court observed that “the legislature determined, 
or could have reasonably determined, that compared to marijuana,” and in 
this case, Schedule III, IV, and V controlled substances, “methamphetamine, 
heroin, and cocaine have more potential for abuse, are less likely to be used 
safely in treatment for medical purposes, and are more addictive, either 
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psychologically or physiologically.” Id. The Court concluded that it was 
thus legitimate for the Legislature “to punish the use of marijuana as a class 
B misdemeanor, while punishing the use of heroin, cocaine, and metham-
phetamine as third degree felonies.” Id. The same holds true for the negli-
gent driving enhancements. The Legislature’s decision to punish Schedule I 
or II use as a second degree felony, while punishing marijuana use as a third 
degree felony, is legitimate where these users drive and negligently cause 
serious bodily injury or death. 
 Finally, Robinson held that a reasonable relationship exists between 
the classification and the legislative purposes. Id. at ¶25. “The legislature 
has a legitimate interest in preventing individuals from using or being un-
der the influence of controlled substances while in Utah.” Id. And in this 
case, the Legislature also has a legitimate interest in preventing people from 
driving while illegally using controlled substances. In both cases, “[t]hat in-
terest increases as the relative harm that a controlled substance presents to 
society increases.” Id. The Legislature has concluded that the risk of harm 
presented by marijuana use is less than that presented by the use of other 
Schedule I and II controlled substances. See id. “The different criminal pen-
alties reflect these relative harms.” Id.  
-32- 
 In sum, as in Robinson, the DWI enhancement statute’s disparate 
treatment based on the type of drug is warranted by reasonable legislative 
objectives. Accordingly, the DWI enhancement statute does not violate the 
Utah Constitution’s guarantee to the uniform operation of laws. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
 Respectfully submitted on October 4, 2016. 
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Utah Const. art. I, § 24 
 All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West 2013) [DUI] 
 (1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
 (a) has sufficient alcohol in the person’s body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
 (b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
 (c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control. 
 (2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 
100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
 (3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
 * * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(2) (West 2013) [DUI with Serious Injury] 
 A person who violates Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a third degree felony if: 
 (a) the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a 
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
 * * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 (West 2013) [DWID – Driving With Illegal Drugs 
in the body] 
 (1) As used in this section: 
 (a) “Controlled substance” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
 (b) “Practitioner” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
 (c) “Prescribe” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
 (d) “Prescription” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
 (2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502, a person may 
not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the 
person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body. 
A-2 
 
 (3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the 
controlled substance was: 
 (a) involuntarily ingested by the accused; 
 (b) prescribed by a practitioner for use by the accused; or 
 (c) otherwise legally ingested. 
 (4) (a) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
 (b) A person who violates this section is subject to conviction and 
sentencing under both this section and any applicable offense under Section 58-
37-8. 
 * * * 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 2016) [Measurable Amount Statute] 
 (2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties and reporting: 
 (a) It is unlawful: 
  (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained 
under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting 
in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized 
by this chapter; 
  * * * 
 (g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
  (i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having 
in the person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
  (ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined inSection 76-1-
601 or the death of another. 
 (h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's 
body: 
  (i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
  (ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-
37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
  (iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
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 (i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious 
bodily injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of 
Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same 
episode of driving. 
 * * * 
 (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of the person’s professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
 * * * 
 (g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
 (i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having 
in the person’s body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
 (ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-
601 or the death of another. 
 (h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person’s 
body: 
 (i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified 
under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
 (ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4 (2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 
58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
 (iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (West 2009) [Automobile Homicide] 
 (2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the 
person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
 (i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
 (ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
 (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater 
at the time of operation. 
 (b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree 
felony if it is subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2). 
 (c) As used in this Subsection (2), “negligent” means simple negligence, the 
failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons 
exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
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SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL w. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which 
JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.1 
BENCH, Senior Judge: 
Cf[l Thomas Randall Ainsworth appeals his convictions and 
sentences for three counts of driving with a measurable amount 
of a controlled substance in his body and negligently causing 
death or serious bodily injury, second-degree felonies. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g)-(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). We 
vacate Ainsworth' s second-degree felony convictions and 
remand for the district court to enter a judgment of conviction 
1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special 
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 11-201(6). 
State v. Ainsworth 
for three third-degree felonies and to resentence him 
accordingly. 
BACKGROUND 
<[2 Ainsworth's actions led to a great tragedy. On December 
24, 2011, Ainsworth drove over a median into oncoming traffic 
and crashed head-on into another vehicle. The driver and front 
passenger sustained serious injury as a result of the crash, and 
their eighteen-month-old child was killed. Ainsworth informed 
police that he had dropped his cell phone on the floor of his 
vehicle and was reaching for it when he lost control of the 
vehicle. Following the accident, Ainsworth' s blood tested 
positive for methamphetamine. 
<[3 Ainsworth was charged with three counts of driving with 
a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the body and 
negligently causing death or serious bodily injury, each a 
second-degree felony. Ainsworth moved to amend one of these 
counts to automobile homicide, a third-degree felony, and the 
other two to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
causing serious bodily injury (DUI With Serious Injury), also a 
third-degree felony, on the ground that section 58-37-8(2)(g) and 
(h) of the Utah Code (the Measurable Amount Statute), under 
which he was charged, violate the Utah Constitution's uniform 
operation of laws provision. In the alternative, he moved the 
court to reduce all three of his charges to third-degree felonies. 
The district court denied Ainsworth' s motion. Ainsworth then 
moved the court to declare the Measurable Amount Statute 
unconstitutional as applied and to reconsider the motion to 
amend. The district court again denied Ainsworth' s motion. 
<JI 4 Ainsworth pleaded guilty to all three charges under the 
Measurable Amount Statute but reserved his right to appeal the 
constitutionality of the statute. Ainsworth requested concurrent 
sentencing, but the district court ordered that Ainsworth serve 
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three consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen years each. 
Ainsworth now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
<[5 Ainsworth first asserts that the district court erred in 
concluding that the Measurable Amount Statute was 
constitutional. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present 
questions of law, which we review for correctness." State v. 
Robinson, 2011 UT 30, <[ 7, 254 P.3d 183 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
<[6 Ainsworth also asserts that the district court exceeded its 
discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. "Because trial 
courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, a court's 
sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State 
v. Epling, 2011 UT App 229, <[ 8, 262 P.3d 440 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Constitutionality of the Measurable Amount Statute 
<[7 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute 
violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, known as 
the uniform operation of laws prov1s1on, by making 
impermissible distinctions between those who may be charged 
under the Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With 
Serious Injury Statute and those who may be charged under the 
Measurable Amount Statute. 
118 Under the Automobile Homicide Statute, a person who, 
while "under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle," "operates a 
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motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of 
another" commits a third-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
207(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Under the DUI With Serious Injury 
Statute, a person who, while "under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle," "inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a 
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner" also commits a third-degree felony. Id. §§ 41-6a-
502(1)(b), -503(2)(a) (2014). But under the Measurable Amount 
Statute, a person who, "in an offense not amounting to a 
violation of [the Automobile Homicide Statute]," "knowingly 
and intentionally [has] in the person's body any measurable 
amount" of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (such as 
methamphetamine) without a valid prescription, "operates a 
motor vehicle ... in a negligent manner," and causes either 
death or serious bodily injury to another commits a second-
degree felony. Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (g), (h)(i) (Supp. 2015). 
119 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute 
violates the uniform operation of laws provision in two ways: 
first, by distinguishing between those who have a prescription 
for a controlled substance and those who do not and, second, by 
classifying a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute by use 
of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as a second-degree 
felony, while classifying the more culpable offenses of 
Automobile Homicide and DUI With Serious Injury as third-
degree felonies. We agree with the State that the legislature has a 
reasonable objective for distinguishing between prescription and 
nonprescription users of controlled substances. However, there 
does not appear to be any rational basis for punishing 
individuals who have "any measurable amount" of controlled 
substance in their bodies more harshly than individuals who 
have an incapacitating amount of the substance in their bodies. 
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<JI10 The uniform operation of laws provision mandates that 
"[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const. art. I, § 24. This provision is an "analogue to the 
federal due process guarantee," Wood v. University of Utah Med. 
Ctr., 2002 UT 134, <JI 33, 67 P.3d 436, but may, "in some 
circumstances, [be] more rigorous than the standard applied 
under the federal constitution," Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, 
<JI 33, 54 P.3d 1069 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In analyzing the constitutionality of a statutory 
scheme under the uniform operation of laws 
provision[] we engage in a three-part inquiry. First, 
we determine what, if any, classification is created 
under the statute. Second, we inquire into whether 
the classification imposes on similarly situated 
persons disparate treatment. Finally, we analyze 
the scheme to determine if the legislature had any 
reasonable objective that warrants the disparity. 
State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, <JI 34, 233 P.3d 476 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the 
legislature had a reasonable objective to warrant a disparity, we 
must consider "(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) 
whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, 
and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the 
classification and the legislative purpose." State v. Robinson, 2011 
UT 30, <JI 22, 254 P.3d 183. "Broad deference is given to the 
legislature when assessing the reasonableness of its 
classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative 
purposes." Id. <JI 23 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
<Jll 1 Ainsworth first challenges the Measurable Amount 
Statute's distinction between those who use controlled 
substances without a prescription and those who use them with 
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a prescription. Those who have a prescription for a controlled 
substance may be charged only under the Automobile Homicide 
Statute or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute, not the 
Measurable Amount Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), (g)(i) (exempting from the Measurable Amount Statute 
those who have a valid prescription). In other words, unlike 
nonprescription users, prescription users can be charged with no 
more than a third-degree felony2 and can be convicted only if the 
State demonstrates that they were intoxicated to a degree that 
rendered them incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. See 
id. § 41-6a-503(2)(a) (2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a) (2012). Thus, the 
Measurable Amount Statute creates a classification. Because the 
same drugs may be used by both types of users and the existence 
of a prescription presumably does not alter the effect of the drug, 
we conclude that prescription and nonprescription users of 
controlled substances are similarly situated. 
]12 However, the classification does not violate the uniform 
operation of laws provision, because the legislature had a 
reasonable basis for making the classification. Ainsworth asserts 
that the distinction between prescription and nonprescription 
users of methamphetamine is not supported by a reasonable 
legislative objective "because the harm presented by a person 
driving with methamphetamine in his system is the same 
regardless of whether he has a prescription." Ainsworth' s 
assertion rests on the mistaken assumption that the only rational 
objective the legislature could have in distinguishing between 
prescription and nonprescription users of controlled substances 
2. Automobile homicide may be a second-degree felony if the 
defendant was criminally negligent or had a previous DUI-
related conviction, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(b), (3) 
(LexisNexis 2012), but Ainsworth was not charged with either of 
those variations of automobile homicide, and they are not at 
issue in this case. 
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is the relative danger they pose when driving. But the legislature 
also has a legitimate interest in regulating the use of controlled 
substances due to their high potential for abuse. Those who use 
such substances pursuant to a valid prescription are subject to 
controls and safeguards, including, among other things, limits 
on their dosages and regulation of manufacturing consistency 
and quality, while those who obtain controlled substances 
illegally are not subject to any such constraints. Thus, the 
legislature has an interest in deterring the illegal use of 
controlled substances. The legislature has no concomitant 
interest in deterring the legal use of prescribed medications so 
long as that use does not render the patient incapable of safely 
operating a motor vehicle. Charging nonprescription controlled-
substance users that have "any measurable amount" of such 
substances in their bodies, while charging prescription users 
only when they are demonstrably unsafe to drive, is rationally 
related to the reasonable objectives of the legislature. 
<[13 Ainsworth next challenges the Measurable Amount 
Statute's distinction between those whose bodies contain "any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-S(g)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and those who are under 
the influence of any controlled substance "to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle," see 
id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a)(ii) (2012). He 
asserts that, as applied to users of Schedule I and II controlled 
substances,3 this distinction is not related to a reasonable 
3. Although users of other types of controlled substances are also 
subject to this classification, the degree of crime they can be 
charged with is lesser or equal to what they would be charged 
with under the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI With 
Serious Injury Statute. Because Ainsworth' s argument 
concerning this classification is premised on the fact that the 
Measurable Amount Statute imposes a greater penalty for a 
(continued ... ) 
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legislative objective, because it punishes less culpable offenders 
with a significantly higher level of punishment. 
<]I14 The State asserts that no classification is created by this 
provision of the Measurable Amount Statute because the 
Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury 
Statute govern only drivers who are under the influence of legal 
intoxicants (alcohol or prescription drugs), not those who are 
under the influence of illegal intoxicants (nonprescribed 
controlled substances). Thus, according to the State, regardless of 
the degree of intoxication, negligently causing injury or death of 
another while driving with any measurable amount of a 
controlled substance for which the user does not have a 
prescription should be prosecuted under the Measurable 
Amount Statute, not the Automobile Homicide Statute or the 
DUI With Serious Injury Statute. 
<]I15 However, the plain language of the Measurable Amount, 
Automobile Homicide, and DUI With Serious Injury Statutes 
belies the State's interpretation. Both the Automobile Homicide 
Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury Statute apply to 
individuals under the influence of "any drug." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a)(ii) 
(2012). Both statutes include controlled substances within the 
definition of "drug." Id. § 41-6a-501(1)(c)(i) (2014) (defining 
( ... continued) 
lesser crime, it challenges the constitutionality of the statute only 
as applied to Schedule I and II users. In requesting that his 
charges be reduced to third-degree felonies, Ainsworth' s 
argument presumes that a charge equal to what a defendant 
could have been charged with under the Automobile Homicide 
Statute or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute would not violate 
the uniform operation of laws provision, so we assume, without 
deciding, that this is the case. 
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"drug" for purposes of the DUI With Serious Injury Statute to 
include controlled substances); id. § 76-5-207(1)(a)(i) (2012) 
(defining "drug" for purposes of the Automobile Homicide 
Statute to include controlled substances); id. § 58-37-2(1)(f) 
(Supp. 2015) (defining "controlled substance" to include 
substances listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act and the federal Controlled Substances 
Act). Neither statute distinguishes between drugs used in 
accordance with a valid prescription and drugs used illegally. 
Thus, by their plain language, these statutes apply to the use of 
both prescription and nonprescription controlled substances. 
Furthermore, the Measurable Amount Statute implicitly 
identifies the Automobile Homicide Statute as defining an 
offense that could apply to users of illegal drugs by specifically 
distinguishing it from the Measurable Amount Statute, stating 
that "[a] person is subject to the penalties" of the Measurable 
Amount Statute when the person violates the statute "in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of [the Automobile Homicide 
Statute]." Id. § 58-37-8(g) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). This 
indicates that the legislature anticipated that the Automobile 
Homicide Statute would apply to nonprescription users of 
controlled substances under certain circumstances. 
<[16 Thus, we agree with Ainsworth that the three statutes 
create a classification distinguishing between similarly situated 
persons-users of nonprescribed controlled substances who 
cause serious injury or death by negligently operating a motor 
vehicle-based on their degree of intoxication: Those who are 
intoxicated by legal or illegal substances to a degree that they are 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle are to be prosecuted 
under the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI With Serious 
Injury Statute. On the other hand, those who have consumed 
illegal substances to a lesser degree, but still have a measurable 
amount in their bodies, are to be prosecuted under the 
Measurable Amount Statute. Because a conviction under the 
Measurable Amount Statute is a second-degree felony when the 
20130924-CA 9 2016 UT App 2 
State v. Ainsworth 
individual has a measurable amount of a Schedule I or II 
controlled substance in his or her body, while convictions under 
the other two statutes are third-degree felonies regardless of the 
type of controlled substance used, unimpaired users of Schedule 
I and II controlled substances are ultimately subject to a greater 
charge for what is otherwise defined to be a lesser crime. 
1[17 There does not appear to be any rational basis for 
charging users of nonprescribed Schedule I or II controlled 
substances who have a measurable amount of controlled 
substance in their body, but not enough to render them 
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, with a higher-
degree crime than users of nonprescribed Schedule I or II 
controlled substances who have so much controlled substance in 
their body that they are demonstrably unsafe to operate a 
vehicle. Thus, we agree with Ainsworth that the second-degree 
designation in subsection (2)(h)(i) in the Measurable Amount 
Statute violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the 
Utah Constitution. 
1[18 When a statutory prov1s1on is determined to be 
unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute will nevertheless 
be allowed to stand if it "is operable and still furthers the 
intended legislative purpose." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 1I 19, 
980 P.2d 191. The legislature has determined that "[i]f any 
provision of [the Measurable Amount Statute], or the application 
of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of [the Measurable Amount Statute] shall be given 
effect without the invalid provision or application." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). Thus, striking the 
second-degree designation in subsection (2)(h)(i) of the 
Measurable Amount Statute does not undermine the legislative 
purpose of the statute. The only question remaining, then, is 
whether subsection (2)(h)(i) can remain operable without its 
second-degree designation. "An offense designated as a felony 
either in [the criminal code] or in another law, without 
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specification as to punishment or category, is a felony of the 
third degree." Id. § 76-3-103 (2012) . Therefore, subsection (2)(h)(i) 
can remain operable as a third-degree felony. Accordingly, we 
vacate Ainsworth' s convictions and remand with instructions for 
the district court to re-enter them as third-degree felonies. 
II. Consecutive Sentencing 
<j[l 9 Because we must vacate Ainsworth' s convictions and 
remand for the district court to adjust the degree of the 
convictions, which will require that the district court also 
resentence him, we need not address Ainsworth' s argument that 
the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. 
Nevertheless, as this issue has been fully briefed and is likely to 
arise on remand, we elect to address it. See State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991). 
<j[20 Ainsworth asserts that the district court exceeded its 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because it failed to 
adequately consider his history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 
Although "[a] court exceeds its discretion if it ... fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors," State v. Epling, 2011 UT 
App 229, <JI 8, 262 P.3d 440, "[i]t is the defendant's burden to 
demonstrate that the trial court failed to properly consider 
legally relevant factors," State v. Bunker, 2015 UT App 255, <JI 3, 
361 P.3d 155. A defendant cannot meet this burden by merely 
pointing to ... the existence of mitigating circumstances." Id. "If 
the record shows that the trial court has reviewed information 
regarding the relevant legal factors, we can infer that the trial 
court adequately considered those factors ." Id. 
<j[21 Ainsworth argues that the court failed to adequately 
consider the fact that his offenses arose out of a single criminal 
episode resulting from negligent rather than intentional 
behavior; that despite not having been amenable to 
rehabilitation in the past, he had expressed genuine remorse and 
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a desire to accept responsibility for his actions; that he has 
participated in substance-abuse classes while in jail and has a 
newfound desire to participate in substance-abuse treatment; 
that he is employed; and that he has strong emotional health and 
family connections. While these factors could have supported a 
decision to impose concurrent sentences, they do not mandate 
such an outcome and we see no indication that the district court 
failed to consider them. On the contrary, the district court 
indicated that it had "carefully considered [Ainsworth's] history 
and rehabilitative needs in reaching [its] decision" but 
concluded that the "nature, circumstances and gravity of the 
offense[,] . . . as well [as] the number of victims" made 
consecutive sentencing appropriate. "The fact that the trial court 
assessed the relevant factors differently than [Ainsworth] would 
have liked does not indicate that it exceeded its discretion." See 
Epling, 2011 UT App 229, 1[ 22. 
CONCLUSION 
1[22 We agree with Ainsworth that subsection (2)(h)(i) of the 
Measurable Amount Statute violates the uniform operation of 
laws provision of the Utah Constitution. Thus, we vacate 
Ainsworth' s convictions and remand with instructions for the 
district court to enter his convictions as third-degree felonies and 
to resentence him accordingly.4 
4. In reducing the degree of Ainsworth' s convictions, as we 
believe the law requires, we by no means wish to discount the 
tragic losses suffered by the victims of Ainsworth' s crimes. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO RENEW 
MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
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Defendant. Judge Himonas 
The Defendant's Motion to Renew Motion to Amend, having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled manner on April 26, 2013, in which the Defendant was represented 
by counsel, David Mack and Caleb Cunningham, and the State was represented by counsel, 
Sandi Johnson. The Court having considered the written motion, and the arguments made by 
counsel, the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 12, 2012 the defendant submitted a "Motion to Amend Information" in this case. 
On August 7, 2012 the State filed a response to the motion. On September 5, 2012 the 
defendant filed his reply. 
2. Oral argument was held before Judge Stone on September 7, 2012. David Mack and 
Caleb Cunningham were counsel for the defendant. Sandi Johnson was counsel for the 
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State. Counsel argued the motion and Judge Stone ruled on the matter, denying the 
defendant's Motion to Amend. 
3. On October 15, 2012 Judge Stone signed an Order denying the defendant's Motion to 
Amend. 
4. The defendant has not alleged a change of facts or case law since Judge Stone entered his 
ruling. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l. The Court finds there is no good cause to depart from the law of the case as determined 
by Judge Stone on October 15, 2012. 
Dated this /0 day of May, 2013. 
Approved as to Form 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney 
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Plaintiff, 
-vs-
THOMAS AINSWORTH, Case No. 121902706 
Defendant. Judge Himonas 
The Defendant's Motion to Declare Sections 58-37-8(2)(g) and (2)(h) Unconstitutional, 
having come before this Court for hearing in the above entitled manner on February 8, 2013 and 
April 26, 2013, in which the Defendant was represented by counsel, David Mack and Caleb 
Cunningham, and the State was represented by counsel, Sandi Johnson. The Court having 
considered the testimony of Dr. Glen Hanson, the written motions, and the arguments made by 
counsel, the Court now enters its Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. The three-step analysis employed by the courts in a Uniform Operations of __,,uu~v 
Challenge is: "(l) whether the statute creates any classifications; (2) whether the 
classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated; and (3) if 
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there is disparate treatment, whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that 
warrants the disparity." State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30,, 17. 
2. In this case, the statute creates a classification of lawful drug users versus unlawful drug 
users. 
3. Similar to State v. Robinson, the statute does not impose any disparate treatment on 
persons similarly situated. 
4. Because the defendant has not met the first two steps of the analysis, the Court does not 
address the third step. 
Dated this~ day of May, 2013. 
Approved as to Form 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney 
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Case No. 121902706 
Judge Himonas 
Based upon the foregoing CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, the Defendant's Motion to 
Declare Sections 58-37-8(2)(g) and (2)(h) Unconstitutional is denied. 
Dated ~day of May, 2013. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Introduction
The use of psychoactive drugs followed by driving has been an issue of continual concern 
to law enforcement officers, physicians, attorneys, forensic toxicologists and traffic 
safety professionals in the U.S. and throughout the world. At issue are methods for 
identifying the impaired driver on the road, the assessment and documentation of the 
impairment they display, the availability of appropriate chemical tests, and the
interpretation of the subsequent results. A panel of international experts on drug-related 
driving issues met to review developments in the field of drugs and human performance 
over the last 10 years; to identify the specific effects that both illicit and prescription 
drugs have on driving; and to develop guidance for others when dealing with drug-
impaired driving problems.  
This publication is based on the deliberations of the International Consultative Panel on 
Drugs and Driving Impairment held in Seattle, WA in August 2000. This meeting was 
sponsored by the National Safety Council, Committee on Alcohol and other Drugs; the 
State of Washington Traffic Safety Commission; and the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. Delegates represented the fields of psychopharmacology,
behavioral psychology, drug chemistry, forensic toxicology, medicine, and law 
enforcement experts trained in the recognition of drug effects on drivers in the field. The 
Fact Sheets reflect the conclusions of the Panel and have been designed to provide 
practical guidance to toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys 
and the general public on issues related to drug impaired driving.  
Sixteen drugs were selected for review and include over-the-counter medications, 
prescription drugs, and illicit and/or abused drugs. The selected drugs are  
cannabis/marijuana, carisoprodol, cocaine, dextromethorphan, diazepam, 
diphenhydramine, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, ketamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, 
methadone, methamphetamine/amphetamine, methylenedioxymethamphetmaine, 
morphine/heroin, phencyclidine, toluene, and zolpidem. 
The Fact Sheets are based on the state of current scientific knowledge and represent the 
conclusions of the panel. They have been designed to provide practical guidance to 
toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys and the general public
to use in the evaluation of future cases. Each individual drug Fact Sheet covers 
information regarding drug chemistry, usage and dosage information, pharmacology, 
drug effects, effects on driving, drug evaluation and classification (DEC), and the panel’s 
assessment of driving risks. A list of key references and recommended reading is also 
provided for each drug. Readers are encouraged to use the Fact Sheets in connection with 
the other cited impaired driving-related texts.  
The information provided is uniform for all the Fact Sheets and provides details on the 
physical description of the drug, synonyms, and pharmaceutical or illicit sources; medical 
and recreational uses, recommended and abused doses, typical routes of administration, 
and potency and purity; mechanism of drug action and major receptor sites; drug
absorption, distribution, metabolism and elimination data; blood and urine 
concentrations; psychological and physiological effects, and drug interactions; drug
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effects on psychomotor performance effects; driving simulator and epidemiology studies; 
and drug recognition evaluation profiles. Each Fact Sheet concludes with general 
statements about the drugs’ ability to impair driving performance. The authors strongly
believe that all the above information needs to be taken into account when evaluating a 
drug. 
Case interpretation can be complicated by a number of factors and one of the main 
limitations of the Fact Sheets is that they primarily relate to single drug use. Other factors 
which influence the risk of effects on driving for any drug include the dose, the dosage 
frequency, acute and residual effects, chronic administration, route of administration, the 
concentration of the drug at the site of action, idiosyncrasies of metabolism, drug
tolerance or hypersensitivity, and the combined effects of the drug with other drugs or 
alcohol, to name but a few. 
Individual Fact Sheets
Cannabis/Marijuana 

Carisoprodol (and Meprobamate) 

Cocaine 

Dextromethorphan 

Diazepam
 
Diphenhydramine 

Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate (GHB, GBL, and 1,4-BD) 

Ketamine
 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) 

Methadone 

Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine)
 
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, Ecstasy)
 
Morphine (and Heroin) 

Phencyclidine (PCP) 

Toluene 

Zolpidem (and Zaleplon, Zopiclone) 

Lead Authors: 

Fiona Couper, Ph.D. and Barry Logan, Ph.D.  
Main contributors: 
Michael J Corbett, Ph.D., Laurel Farrell, BS, Marilyn Huestis Ph.D., Wayne Jeffrey, BS, 
Jan Raemakers Ph.D. 
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Other delegates to the consensus conference: 
Marcelline Burns, Ph.D.; Yale Caplan, Ph.D.; Dennis Crouch, BS, MBA; Johann De
Gier, Ph.D.; Olaf Drummer Ph.D.; Kurt Dubowski, Ph.D.; Robert Forney Jr., Ph.D.; 
Bernd Freidel, M.D.; Manfred Moeller, Ph.D.; Thomas Page, BA; Lionel Raymon, 
Pharm.D., Ph.D., Wim Riedel, Ph.D.; Laurent Rivier, Ph.D.; Annemiek Vermeeren, 
Ph.D. and H. Chip Walls BS. Other participants included James F. Frank, Ph.D.  from the 
NHTSA Office of Research & Technology;  Sgt. Steven Johnson of the Washington State 
Patrol; Capt. Chuck Hayes of the Oregon State Patrol; and Sgt. Douglas Paquette of the
New York State Police. 
Disclaimer 
The information contained in the Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets represents
the views of the contributors and not necessarily those of their place of employment or  
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
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Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine) 
Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a white to light brown crystalline powder, or clear
chunky crystals resembling ice. Methamphetamine base is a liquid.  
Synonyms: Methamphetamine: chalk, chrissy, crank, crystal, glass, go, hydro, ice, meth, 
rock candy, speed, whiz; Desoxyn®; Amphetamine: dextroamphetamine; Dexedrine®, 
Adderall®, Benzedrine®, DextroStat®, Biphetamine®, Gradumet®.  
Source:   The majority of street methamphetamine is produced in clandestine laboratories 
(e.g. reduction of l-ephedrine or d-pseudoephedrine over red phosphorus with hydroiodic 
acid, or reduction with sodium or lithium in condensed liquid ammonia). 
Methamphetamine remains concentrated in western U. S. states and some rural areas 
elsewhere. d-Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance (Desoxyn®) 
available in 5 mg white, 10 mg pink, and 15 mg yellow strength tablets. Amphetamine is 
also a Schedule II controlled substance and is usually supplied as the sulfate salt of the d-
isomer (Dexedrine®), or as the racemic mixture (Benzedrine®), or a mixture of the two 
(Adderall®). Dexedrine® is available in 5, 10, and 15 mg strength, orange/black 
capsules, or 5 mg tablets. Adderall® is available in 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 20, and 30 mg
strength, blue or orange tablets.  
Drug Class:   CNS stimulant, sympathomimetic, appetite suppressant. 
Medical and Recreational Uses:   Medicinally, methamphetamine is used in the 
treatment of narcolepsy, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Typical doses are 10 mg/day or up to 40 mg daily, and a 
course of greater than six weeks is not recommended. Methamphetamine is infrequently
used in the treatment of obesity, overeating disorders, and weight loss due to its abuse 
potential. Amphetamine is also used in ADD, narcolepsy, and weight control. 
Recreationally, methamphetamine is abused to increase alertness, relieve fatigue, control 
weight, treat mild depression, and for its intense euphoric effects. 
Potency, Purity and Dose:   Purity of methamphetamine is currently very high, at 60­
90%, and is predominantly d-methamphetamine which has greater CNS potency than the
l-isomer or the racemic mixture. Common abused doses are 100-1000 mg/day, and up to 
5000 mg/day in chronic binge use. Therapeutic doses of Desoxyn® are 2.5-10 mg daily,
with dosing not exceed 60 mg/day. To treat narcolepsy, 5-60 mg/day of amphetamine is
ingested in divided doses; and in ADD and ADHD doses of 2.5-10 mg/day is 
administered, depending on age. 
Route of Administration: Methamphetamine users often begin with intranasal or oral 
use and progress to intravenous use, and occasionally smoking. In contrast to cocaine, the 
hydrochloride salt of methamphetamine can itself be smoked. Methamphetamine is used 
sometimes with alcohol or marijuana, particularly during the withdrawal phase.  
Pharmacodynamics:   Methamphetamine increases synaptic levels of the
neurotransmitters dopamine, serotonin (5-HT) and norepinephrine, and has α and β
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adrenergic agonist effects. Norepinephrine is responsible for methamphetamine’s 
alerting, anorectic, locomotor and sympathomimetic effects; dopamine stimulates 
locomotor effects, psychosis, and perception disturbances; and 5HT is responsible for 
delusions and psychosis. Methamphetamine’s effects are similar to cocaine but its onset
is slower and the duration is longer. Racemic amphetamine and d-amphetamine have 
similar chemical properties and actions to methamphetamine but are less potent.  
Pharmacokinetics:   Following oral administration, peak methamphetamine 
concentrations are seen in 2.6-3.6 hours and the mean elimination half-life is 10.1 hours 
(range 6.4-15 hours). The amphetamine metabolite peaks at 12 hours. Following
intravenous injection, the mean elimination half-life is slightly longer (12.2 hours). 
Methamphetamine is metabolized to amphetamine (active), p-OH-amphetamine and 
norephedrine (both inactive). Several other drugs are metabolized to amphetamine and 
methamphetamine and include benzphetamine, selegeline, and famprofazone.  
Molecular Interactions / Receptor Chemistry:   Methamphetamine is metabolized to 
amphetamine via cytochrome P450 2D6. Potential inhibitors of the 2D6 isoenzyme could 
decrease the rate of methamphetamine elimination if administered concurrently, while 
potential inducers could increase the rate of elimination. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio:  0.65 (N=1). 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations:   Blood concentrations can generally be used to 
distinguish therapeutic use from abuse. Concentrations of 0.02-0.05 mg/L are typical for 
therapeutic use, and up to 0.2 mg/L have been documented. Concentrations greater than 
this represent abuse. Concentrations do not disclose phase of use. Normal concentrations 
in recreational use are 0.01 to 2.5 mg/L (median 0.6 mg/L). Concentrations above this 
range will likely be associated with severe, possibly life threatening, toxicity. There is no 
evidence for improved performance in any task or test following use of doses greater than 
40 mg (or concentrations greater than 0.2 mg/L).  
Peak blood methamphetamine concentrations occur shortly after injection, a few 
minutes after smoking, and around 3 hours after oral dosing. Peak plasma amphetamine 
concentrations occur around 10 hours after methamphetamine use. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results:   Positive results generally indicate use within 1-4 

days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use. Rate of excretion into the 

urine is heavily influenced by urinary pH. Between 30-54% of an oral dose is excreted in 

urine as unchanged methamphetamine and 10-23% as unchanged amphetamine. 

Following an intravenous dose, 45% is excreted as unchanged parent drug and 7% 

amphetamine.
 
Effects:   Methamphetamine effects are less intense after oral ingestion than following
 
smoked or intravenous use. 

Early phase – Psychological:  Euphoria, excitation, exhilaration, rapid flight of ideas, 

increased libido, rapid speech, motor restlessness, hallucinations, delusions, psychosis, 

insomnia, reduced fatigue or drowsiness, increased alertness, heightened sense of well
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being, stereotypes behavior, feelings of increased physical strength, and poor impulse 

control. 

Early phase – Physiological: Increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, increased 

respiration rate, elevated temperature, palpitations, irregular heartbeat, dry mouth, 

abdominal cramps, appetite suppressed, twitching, pallor, dilated pupils, HGN at high 

doses, faster reaction time, increased strength, and more efficient glucose utilization.   

Late phase – Psychological:  Dysphoria, residual stimulation, restlessness, agitation, 

nervousness, paranoia, violence, aggression, lack of coordination, pseudo-hallucinations, 

delusions, psychosis, and drug craving. 

Late phase – Physiological: Fatigue, sleepiness with sudden starts, 

itching/picking/scratching, normal heart rate, and normal to small pupils which are
 
reactive to light. 

Binge use of methamphetamine can be broken down into the following phases: 
Rush – (5 minutes) intense euphoria, rapid flight of ideas, sexual stimulation, high 
energy, obsessive/compulsive activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Shoulder – 
(1 hour) less intense euphoria, hyperactivity, rapid flight of ideas, obsessive/compulsive 
activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Binge use – (1-5 days) the drug is frequently
readministered in an attempt to regain or maintain euphoria; Tweaking – (4-24 hours) 
dysphoria, scattered and disorganized thought, intense craving, paranoia, anxiety and 
irritability, hypervigilance, auditory and tactile hallucinations, delusions, and normal 
pupils; Crash – (1-3 days) intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and catnapping, 
continuing stimulation, drug craving; Normal – (2-7 days) apparent return to “normalcy”
although drug craving may appear; Withdrawal – anergia, anhedonia, waves of intense 
craving, depression, hypersomnolence, exhaustion, extreme fatigue. 
Side Effect Profile: Light sensitivity, irritability, insomnia, nervousness, headache, 
tremors, anxiety, suspiciousness, paranoia, aggressiveness, delusions, hallucinations, 
irrational behavior, and violence. In overdose, symptoms may include hyperthermia, 
tachycardia, severe hypertension, convulsions, chest pains, stroke, cardiovascular 
collapse, and possible death. Other common side effects following abuse of
amphetamines include viral hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), HIV, 
septicemia, abscesses, collapsed blood vessels, and malnutrition. Chronic abuse generally
produces a psychosis that resembles schizophrenia and is characterized by paranoia, 
picking at the skin, preoccupation with one’s own thoughts, and auditory and visual 
hallucinations. Violent and erratic behavior is frequently seen among chronic abusers. 
Over time, methamphetamine appears to cause reduced levels of dopamine, which can 
result in symptoms like those of Parkinson’s disease.
Duration of Effects: Onset of effects is rapid following intravenous use and smoking, 
while effects onset more slowly following oral use. Overall effects typically last 4-8 
hours; residual effects can last up to 12 hours.  
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effect:   Methamphetamine has a high potential 
for abuse and dependence. Tolerance may develop and users may quickly become 
addicted and use it with increasing frequency and in increasing doses. Abrupt 
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discontinuation of use can produce extreme fatigue, mental depression, apathy, long
periods of sleep, irritability, and disorientation. 
Drug Interactions:   Phenobarbital, propoxyphene, phenytoin and MAOI’s slow the 
metabolism of amphetamines and increases their effect on the release of norepinephrine 
and other monoamines from adrenergic nerve endings. Amphetamines may counteract 
sedative effects of antihistamines. Methamphetamine may restore ethanol induced
impairment in simple repetitive tasks of short duration, however, there is no restoration of 
ethanol-induced deficits of balance and steadiness. In general, high doses of
amphetamines are likely to increase the impairing effects of alcohol. Chlorpromazine and 
haloperidol block dopamine and norepinephrine reuptake, thus inhibiting the central 
stimulant effects of amphetamines. Amphetamine potentiates the analgesic effect of 
meperidine. 
Performance Effects: Laboratory studies have been limited to much lower doses than
those used by methamphetamine abusers. Doses of 10-30 mg methamphetamine have 
shown to improve reaction time, relief fatigue, improve cognitive function testing, 
increase subjective feelings of alertness, increase time estimation, and increase euphoria. 
However, subjects were willing to make more high-risk choices. The majority of 
laboratory tests were administered 1 hour post dose. Expected performance effects 
following higher doses may include agitation, inability to focus attention on divided 
attention tasks, inattention, restlessness, motor excitation, increased reaction time, and 
time distortion, depressed reflexes, poor balance and coordination, and inability to follow 
directions. 
Effects on Driving:  The drug manufacturer states that patients should be informed that 
methamphetamine and amphetamine may impair the ability to engage in potentially
hazardous activities such as driving a motor vehicle. In epidemiology studies drive-off­
the-road type accidents, high speed, failing to stop, diminished divided attention, 
inattentive driving, impatience, and high risk driving have been reported. Significant 
impairment of driving performance would also be expected during drug withdrawal. In a 
recent review of 101 driving under the influence cases, where methamphetamine was the 
only drug detected, blood concentrations ranged from <0.05-2.36 mg/L (mean 0.35 mg/L, 
median 0.23 mg/L). Driving and driver behaviors included speeding, lane travel, erratic 
driving, accidents, nervousness, rapid and non-stop speech, unintelligible speech, 
disorientation, agitation, staggering and awkward movements, irrational or violent 
behavior, and unconsciousness. Impairment was attributed to distraction, disorientation, 
motor excitation, hyperactive reflexes, general cognitive impairment, or withdrawal, 
fatigue and hypersomnolence. 
DEC Category: CNS stimulant. 
DEC Profile:   Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze nystagmus not 
present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size dilated; reaction to light slow; pulse 
rate elevated; blood pressure elevated; body temperature normal to down. Other 
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characteristic indicators may include restlessness, body tremors, talkativeness, 
exaggerated reflexes, anxiety, and track marks or recent injection sites. 
Panel’s Assessment of Driving Risks:  At lower dose, amphetamines have few effects on 
cognitive functioning and may result in an enhancement of some psychomotor tasks, but 
risk-taking increases at higher doses and responses become inappropriate. Drug
withdrawal could also lead to the impairment of psychomotor skills required for safe
driving. 
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